builds a pioneering and influential model, in which an insider with long-lived private information submits an optimal order in each period given the market maker's pricing rule. An inconsistency exists to some extent in the sense that the "constant pricing rule " actually assumes an adaptive expected price with pricing rule given before insider making the decision, and the "market efficiency" condition, however, assumes a rational expected price and implies that the pricing rule can be influenced by insider's strategy. We loosen the "constant pricing rule " assumption by taking into account sufficiently the insider's strategy has on pricing rule. According to the characteristic of the conditional expectation of the informed profits, three different models vary with insider's attitudes regarding to risk are presented. Compared to Kyle (1985) , the risk-averse insider in Model 1 can obtain larger guaranteed profits, the risk-neutral insider in Model 2 can obtain a larger ex ante expectation of total profits across all periods and the risk-seeking insider in Model 3 can obtain larger risky profits. Moreover, the limit behaviors of the three models when trading frequency approaches infinity are given, showing that Model 1 acquires a strong-form efficiency, Model 2 acquires the Kyle's (1985) continuous equilibrium, and Model 3 acquires an equilibrium with information released at an increasing speed.
INTRODUCTION
THE MOTIVATION of our paper is to improve the canonical strategic trading model due to Kyle (1985) . In Kyle (1985) , the price adjustment made by market maker is proportional to the total trading volume in which the proportional coefficient λ n , named as the pricing rule (or liquidity parameter, or inverse of market depth), reflects the market maker's sensitivity regarding to the total trading volume. A strong assumption is the "constant pricing rule", which means that the insider takes the pricing rule as a constant and thus ignores the effect her strategy has on it. We loosen this assumption by taking into account sufficiently the effect that insider's choice might have on pricing rule.
The "constant pricing rule" is not only just a "very strong" assumption, but also can induce to some extent an inconsistency in Kyle (1985) . In fact, the (semi-strong) market efficiency condition implies that the pricing rule λ n dose can be affected by insider's submission. In other words, the constant pricing rule announced by market maker is untrustable in an semi-strong efficient market. Accordingly, the insider has an incentive to deviate from the optimal strategy depicted in Kyle (1985) to make a more profitable strategy since she know the market maker would adjust the price to the deviated strategy to satisfy the market efficiency condition. Thus, a new equilibrium arises in which the insider's strategy can be characterized in a more reasonable manner.
An interesting specific case is the one period Kyle model, where equilibrium is the same whether with the constant pricing rule assumption or not. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) point out this coincidence when they investigate the clustering phenomena in a model with short lived private information. Generally, in each period except the last one in a multiple periods model, as long as the insider takes market maker's response into account, the conditional expectation of profits over the remaining periods, as a random variance, has no maximum any more since the risky profits and guaranteed profits that constitute the conditional expectation cannot attain their maximums simultaneously. Hence we present three different models varies with the maximization manner. Model 1 focuses on the risk-averse insider who maximizes the guaranteed profits firstly and then, if multiple solutions are obtained, chooses among them the one that maximizes the risky profits. Insider in Model 2 is risk-neutral, trying to maximize the ex ante expectation of total profits. While Model 3 assumes a risk-seeking insider who maximizes the profits in an order reverse to that in Model 1.
In Model 1 with a risk-averse insider, when trading happens indefinitely frequently, the private information is incorporated into price almost immediately, thus in limit Model 1 presents a "strong efficient" market that defined by Fama (1970) as one with prices reflecting both public and private information. This result is analogous to Holden and Subrahamanyam (1992) with multiple perfectly informed traders. However, there is only one insider in Model 1 and the source of this result is risk aversion, not like theirs -the aggressive competition among insiders. Chau and Vayanos (2008) also obtain a strong form efficiency with one insider when trading happens frequently. Their conclusion depends crucially on the combination of impatience and stationarity. While in our model, there are no such assumptions since in Model 1 the insider receives the information by one time and there exist no channels such like time discounting, the public revelation and the obsolescence of private information that generate cost linked to impatience. Last but not least, compared to Kyle (1985) , risk-averse insider in Model 1 obtains greater guaranteed profits at the cost of smaller risky profits estimated at the beginning of trading.
Model 2 shows that the risk-neutral insider transfers her information to public price gradually when trading happens frequently. In discrete time case, by producing a more profitable market depth, the insider is able to obtain a larger ex ante expectation of total profits across all periods than that in Kyle (1985) . In the limit as the number of trading periods becomes infinity, however, the insider cannot be rewarded by additional ability of affecting the pricing rule. In fact, the difference in equilibriums between Model 2 and Kyle (1985) is disappearing as trading frequency is growing, since that in limit the constant liquidity parameter given by market maker in Kyle (1985) is exactly the one the insider would like to choose provided her with such discretion.
In Model 3, the risk-seeking insider has an incentive to postpone trades to the future to create greater risk in future profits. Thus, strategic trading in Model 3 is in sharp contrast with those in Model 1, 2 and Kyle (1985) in that, insider prefers to the trading pattern with less information released early on and greater information revealed latter to keep information advantage as long as possible. Moreover, Model 3 allows an increasing liquidity parameter through trades, consistent with the results motivated by the "rat race" effect in Foster and Viswanathan (1996) with competitive insiders endowed with negatively correlated information.
There are large numbers of literature extending Kyle's (1985) strategic trading model. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) consider the competition among multiple insiders each endowed with perfect private information. While Foster and Viswanathan (1996) signal that tracts the evolution of asset's fundamental value and with a random public announcement time revealing the current value of asset. A common characterization is that they all inherit the Kyle assumption that the risk-neutral insider considers liquidity param-eter as a constant given by market maker. Although several papers such like Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) , Baruch (2002) and Zhang (2004) extend Kyle model to accomodate risk-averse insider, still they remain the constant pricing rule assumption unchanged. Hence, our new improvements on Kyle model by considering both the possibility of insider's effect on pricing rule and of the insider's risk different attitudes might have potential applications on various models based on Kyle (1985) .
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our three models based on analysis of Kyle (1985) . Section 3 focuses on Model 1, deriving the sequential auction equilibrium in discrete time setting, showing the limit results when the trading period number goes to infinity, and illustrating the endogenous parameters numerically. Section 4 and section 5 are devoted to Model 2 and Model 3 respectively. Finally, section 6 makes some concluding comments.
ANALYSIS ABOUT KYLE (1985) MODEL AND PRESENTATION OF OUR MODELS

Basic Notations
We conform to the notation of Kyle (1985) . A risky asset has a liquidation value v, normally distributed with mean p 0 and variance σ 2 v . The asset is traded in N sequential moments {t n } n=1,··· ,N with t n = n∆t N and ∆t N = 1/N. The market participants are insider, market maker and noise traders. The insider knows the true value v and she submits trading volume x n in the nth period, with her profits in the nth period denoted by π n . Noise traders' total demand in the nth period denoted by u n is exogenously-generated, normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2 u ∆t N in the N periods model. Market maker observes the total trading volume y n = x n + u n prior to the nth auction, and then absorbs it at price p n . An important assumption following Kyle (1985) in our paper is that p n satisfies Assumption 1. (Semi-strong) Market Efficiency:
Before presenting our new models, we analyze the roles played by assumption 1 and the "constant pricing rule" assumption in Kyle (1985) .
2.2.
The Constant Pricing Rule Assumption in Kyle (1985) To find an equilibrium, Kyle gives three assumptions -market efficiency, profit maximization and "constant pricing rule" assumption in definition "linear equilibrium" (page 1321).
We examine the last assumption carefully and attempt to find out how it works in searching of the equilibrium. Before fixing the optimal value for strategy x n at the nth period, Kyle claims, in a linear equilibrium, p n is given by
where h is some linear function of x 1 + u 1 , · · · , x n−1 + u n−1 (page 1324). And then, λ n is regarded as a constant independent with insider's strategy x n in Kyle's following deduction:
Clearly, by assuming the constant pricing rule in definition "linear equilibrium", the insider treats pricing rule λ n as unrelated to her choice.
2.3.
The Strategy Space in Kyle (1985) It appears that in Kyle's model, insider's strategy is chosen from the space consists of functions measurable to information available to him. However, careful examination shows that a good property about x n is actually used before its value being fixed. In fact, (2.2) can hold only in the following deduction:
If x 1 , · · · , x n are not gaussian, the expression of p n (2.2) cannot be certainly ensured.
1 The conditional expectation in the above, usually as a nonlinear measurable function of x 1 + u 1 , · · · , x n + u n , is hard to get an explicit expression. Subsequently, the cumulative profits (ie., Eq.(3.24) in page 1324) satisfying
2) needs not hold. Generally, by definition of conditional expectation (Kallenberg, Olav (2002) , page 103, 104),
is just an orthogonal Hilbert space projection of v onto the linear subspace
is not an explicit function of x n any more and thus the maximization problem cannot be solved. Eventually, all relationships that build upon the method of backward induction will no longer hold. In conclusion, insider's strategy in Kyle (1985) model is actually chosen from the gaussian space.
An Inconsistency Implied in Kyle model
Given gaussian strategy in each period, we know the orders y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n are normally distributed variables. The orthogonalization of y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n produces:
y k represents the surprise in the ith (1 ≤ i ≤ n) total trading volume. The assumption of market efficiency (2.1) implies
Obviously, the informed submission x n does affect the pricing rule through the trading intensity β n . Thus, an inconsistency yields between the implications of the "market efficiency" assumption and of the "constant pricing rule".
In a semi-strong efficient market, insider with the gaussian strategy (thus, (2.3) holds.) has an incentive to deviate from the "optimal strategy" depicted in the equilibrium of Kyle (1985) to create a more profitable pricing rule. To maintain the market efficiency, the market maker would adjust the price according to the new strategy insider will choose. Interestingly, for Kyle's one period model, equilibrium is the same whether or not the insider ignores the effect her strategy on pricing rule. Admati and Pfleiderer (1998) PROPORSITION 1. In equilibrium of the two periods Kyle (1985) model, the pricing rule in the first period satisfies
Proposition 1 shows that in the first period of the two periods model, those informed submissions around the optimum in Kyle (1985) have positive effect on the pricing rule.
Presentation of Our Models
Note that σ{y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n−1 , v} = σ{y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n−1 , v −p n−1 } since the price p n−1 , satisfying (2.1), is measurable to the historical information y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n−1 . Thus, each gaussian strategy x n measurable to σ{y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n−1 , v} has the following form:
in which β n , c n ∈ R and b n (y 1 , · · · , y n−1 ) is a linear function of y 1 , · · · , y n−1 . Under assumption (2.1), the following proposition characterizes the profits of insider with any submission (2.6).
PROPORSITION 2. Under assumption (2.1), when insider adopts strategies such as (2.6), there exist non-random real numbers (2.10) with α N = h N = δ N = 0 and λ n satisfying (2.3). In (2.6), the submission structured on historical information b n (y 1 , · · · , y n−1 ) and insider's average submission c n can affect the conditional profits (2.7) only through the term h n−1 (v − p n−1 ). Moreover, b n (y 1 , · · · , y n−1 ) and c n cannot affect any of
Proposition 2 shows that, in the nth period, the submission structured on common knowledge b n (y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n−1 ) + c n yields zero profits in ex ante expectation. Moreover, when insider chooses b n (y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n−1 ) + c n unbounded and the other parameters bounded in her plan, then at the case v −p n−1 > 0(< 0), her conditional profits (loss) will be unbounded. To avoid the technical trouble with thus strategies that always yield zero profits in ex ante expectation and can yield infinite profits in absolute value, we consider a limited strategy space on insider. That is, the space of strategies constructed on the estimation error v −p n−1 which represents the totally unrevealed information in the sense it is independent with historical information y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n−1 and thus exclusively known to the insider:
(2.11) (2.11) is actually the strategy space that contains the "optimal" informed strategy depicted in Kyle(1985) . Note that x n ∈ X n implies y n = y n in (2.3), and this will be used throughout the rest of the article.
As shown by (2.7) and (2.9), insider with strategy x n ∈ X n acquires profits accumulated from the nth period to the end:
The optimal strategy β n (v − p n−1 ) , or equivalently, β n , should be determined in equilibrium by profit-maximization principle. However, generally, (2.12) has no maximization due to the partial ordering among conditional expectations and thus directly maximizing (2.12) is meaningless. Note that insider's conditional profits consist of two different terms, the risky
2 as the source of risk, and guaranteed profits δ n−1 that cannot be affected by the realization of v or p n−1 . Naturally, three models, each with the Assumption 1 and a different profit-maximization principle stated by Assumption 2 are presented.
Assumption 2. Profit Maximization: At the nth (1 ≤ n ≤ N) period, with the informed strategy space (2.11) and the informed profits (2.12),
• Model 1 (the risk-averse insider model): the insider firstly maximizes the guaranteed profit max βn δ n−1 , and secondly she maximizes the risky profits
• Model 2 (the risk-neutral insider model): the insider maximizes the ex ante expectation
• Model 3 (the risk-seeking insider model): the insider firstly maximizes the risky profit
and secondly she maximizes the guaranteed profit THEOREM 1. In Model 1 with trading period number N, a subgame perfect linear equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, there are real numbers β n , λ n , α n and Σ n , such that
The above real numbers β n , α n and Σ n can be represented as:
in which the sequences {a n }, {b n }, {c n }, subject to terminal values a N −1 = 0, b N −1 = 1 2 , c N = 1, are given recursively:
where c n > 0, n = 1, 2, · · · , N.
PROOF:
The proof is by backward induction. The problem in the last period is choosing the optimal strategy x N = β N (v − p N −1 ) or equivalently, β N , in the maximization problem:
As seen from (3.11), with the amount of information available Σ 1/2 N −1 and the estimation error v − p N −1 , the insider will choose the maximizing value
Thus, (3.4) holds when n = N with
In general, if in the n + 1th period, insider's optimal strategy β n+1 supports profits
Additionally, by definitions, we have
Further, another relationship follows from (3.16) and (3.17):
Substituting (3.12) (3.18) and (3.16) into (3.14) and into (3.15) respectively yields α n−1 and
by (3.14) and (3.12),
by (3.18) and (3.16) ,
u ∆t N by (3.14) and (3.12),
3/2 by (3.18) and (3.16) .
Therefore, solving max βn δ n−1 (β n ) yields: when 2b n − a n > 0, a n ≥ 0, b n ≥ 0 and a n + b n > 0 (since calculation shows the FOC and SOC require c n (a n + b n ) > 0),
Due to the fact that
the negative β n is excluded. Thus, for n, (3.7) with (3.10) holds. Moreover, substituting (3. 7) into (3.19), we find
n−1 with b n−1 satisfying (3.9). While substituting (3.7) into (3.20) yields δ n−1 = a n−1 σ u ∆t
n−1 with a n−1 satisfying (3.8).
The difference equation system (3.8) (3.9) and (3.10) gives a unique solution for sequences {a n }, {b n } and {c n } with terminal value a N −1 , b N −1 and c N . In fact, if a n , b n and c n+1 are fixed, then (3.10) yields c n , and in turn, substituting c n into (3.8) yields a n−1 , and into (3.9) yields b n−1 .
At last, verify the conditions 2b n − a n > 0, a n ≥ 0, b n ≥ 0 and a n + b n > 0 as follows. In the last periods, these conditions hold since
. Suppose for a general n, theses conditions hold, then from the above proof, (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) with c n > 0 can be acquired and substituting them into 2b n−1 − a n−1 yields
Further,
and a n−1 + b n−1 > 0 is obvious. In conclusion, these conditions hold and hence Theorem 1 is proved.
Q.E.D.
Recall that in Kyle (1985) , insider's optimal submission depends the value of λ n announced by market maker. In equilibrium of Model 1, however, it is expressed explicitly as proportional to the product of amount of camouflage and inverse of information available
n−1 , involving no pricing rule λ n . On the other hand, like Kyle (1985) , inspecting insider's profits shows that both the expectation of risky profits α n−1 (v − p n−1 ) 2 and guaranteed profits δ n−1 are proportional to the product of amount of camouflage and infor-
And inspecting the other parameters shows, if σ u doubles, then α n , β n , δ n double, Σ n by (3.17) is unaffected and λ n by (3.16) halves. Additionally, the SOC c n > 0 rules out the strategies trading inversely on private information which are also not present in Kyle (1985) .
As seen from (3.7), the trading intensity sequence {β n } is increasing over nearly all trading rounds for two reasons. (i) By (3.17), the information available Σ 1/2 n−1 is decreasing over trading, and thus the insider needs to trade more intensively to reveal the private information when it is of less scale. (ii) As will be shown, c n is increasing with n when n < N. This is consistent with the decreasing concern about the effect current trades has on the future with time going on. Literatures examining the increasing trading intensities usually notice the second reason but ignore the first one, might because trading intensities in Kyle (1985) are expressed less explicitly than us.
As to the relationship between the insider's strategy and her profits, equation (3.10) gives some intuitive insights. A simple calculation shows, the insider's trading intensity coefficient c n is increasing with b n /a n i.e., the ratio of marginal guaranteed profits to marginal risky profits estimated in the next ( n + 1th ) period. Thus, if a n is relatively large, then the insider has an incentive to trade less currently to keep more information for the next period since she has a large ability to acquire high guaranteed profits in the next period.
A special case can be solved easily is the two periods case. Firstly, recall that Kyle (1985) model has an equilibrium when N=2 (see Huddart etal., (2001, Proposition 1) ), with endogenous parameters added an upper index (0) to distinguish from those in our models,
Whereas in Model 1 with endogenous parameters added an upper index (1), we have:
0 .
Clearly, compared to Kyle (1985) , the insider can expect to obtain increased guaranteed profits at the cost of decreased risky profits at the beginning of trading. For a general N > 2, to examine how the unrevealed information Σ n , the liquidity parameter λ n and the trading intensity β n perform, we need to resort to the numerical method, before that, the limit results when N → ∞ can give some important theoretical guidance. c n with a holden n, characterizing what happens just after the beginning of trading. The former class of limits is called the "first class of limits", and the latter is called the "second class of limits" in Holden and subrahmanyam (1992) . To start the work, the following proposition establishes some preliminary results for the main results.
PROPORSITION 3. The sequence {c n } in Theorem 1 can be achieved as follows. Given c n and c n−1 , c n−2 is determined by the unique root in (0, 1) of equation
with terminal values c N −1 = √ 2, c N = 1. Moreover, the following monotonicity holds:
b n has a representation of c n and c n−1
and also does a n a n = 2 − c 2 n c 2 n + 1
Based on Proposition 3, we obtain all endogenous parameters' limits when trading frequency goes to infinity as well as the speeds of convergence with which the limits are obtained.
2 THEOREM 2. When N → ∞ (equivalently, ∆t N → 0), the sequences {a n }, {b n }, {c n } in Theorem 1 have limits: (3.31) and the limits of c n , b n and a n with n holden when N → ∞ correspond to t = 0 respectively in above results.
The unrevealed information Σ n satisfies, for any t ∈ (0, 1],
The liquidity parameter λ n satisfies, for a holden n,
and for any t ∈ (0, 1],
The trading intensity β n satisfies, for a holden n, (3.36) and for any t ∈ (0, 1],
Estimated at the beginning of trading, Model 1 in limit implies infinity guaranteed profits and zero risky profits since Theorem 2 shows that a n and b n with n holden are of order ∆t −1/4 N in (3.5) and (3.6). Thus the results in the two periods case are confirmed. Now, examine the limit behaviors of the endogenous parameters-unrevealed information, liquidity parameter and trading intensity. The first class of limits of unrevealed information sequence (3.32) shows that the private information is dissipated immediately (in an arbitrary small time horizon). Thus the strong-form efficiency characterized by Fama (1970) can be realized within any positive time t when trading happens continuously. Inequality (3.33) indicates that when N increases, prices incorporate the fundamental value at an exponential speed. (3.37) says, the trading intensity goes to infinity at any calendar time t > 0. While the second class of limits (3.36) shows that in the initial periods, the insider trades little on private information. It is striking that the initial low trading intensities (or expected trading volumes 3 ) can eliminate most information asymmetry so quickly. This stems from the fact that the market maker responses to every unit of the order extremely sensitively in initial periods, as shown by (3.34). By contrast, by (3.35), at any positive calendar time t when market maker has lost the high sensitivity due to the little scale of unrevealed information, the insider would like to trade extremely aggressively on her information.
These results are similar to those of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) model with competitive risk-neutral insiders and are in substantial contrast to those of the Kyle (1985) with a single insider. Chau and Vayanos (2008) 
Numerical Results
To illustrate Model 1 numerically, we consider the model's implication in a variety of settings. We are interested in how information is released through trading, how the insider's trading intensity changes through time, how the market maker adjusts price in response to the order flow, and how lengthening the number of trading periods affects some of these parameters.
The specific parameterization that we choose is Σ 0 = 1, σ u = 0.5 and this is also the
β n Σ n−1 . Therefore, when N is large enough, for a holden n, E
. Thus the initial periods possess relatively low expected trading volumes. 
The approximation by limit results and the actual discrete results when N=1000. 
Intensity trading on private information β n with changing period numbers N = 5, N = 20, N = 100. Figure 1(a) shows the evolution of unrevealed information Σ n . For each trading number N, Σ n declines to zero very rapidly through time and as the number of periods increases, the dropping speed increases dramatically. In fact, when N = 100, by the 7th period, more than percent 95 information asymmetry has been eliminated. Thus, the risk-averse insider prefers to the trading pattern with trading concentrated at initial periods to diminish the risk in future profits. Foster and Viswanathan (1996) also examine this trading pattern numerically, stemming from the "rat race" effect among competitive insiders with high correlated private signals. By contrast, in Model 1, it is the risk aversion that motivates this pattern, which applies even with a monopolistic insider setting. unrevealed information implies a low adverse selection latter. As the number of trading rounds increasing, the contrast of adverse selections between the early and the later rounds is more marked since the higher value for the early rounds and lower for the later is producing a more dramatic decline.
Figure 3(a) shows that β n evolves in a manner contrary to those of Σ n and λ n . For each period number N, β n is increasing through all trading periods. As mentioned earlier, this stems from the decreasing information available and the decreasing concern for the effect of current trading on future profits. Moreover, for large N, insider's trading on private information is more intense, with a sharper increase and a higher terminal value.
At last, figures 1(b), 2(b), 3(b) show that when N is large sufficient (N=1000, 1000, 50 respectively), the limit results obtained by asymptotic analysis can give a good characterization to the actual discrete results.
MODEL 2: THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE RISKY-NEUTRAL INSIDER MODEL
The Discrete Equilibrium
Different with Model 1 in profit-maximization manner, insider in Model 2 treats the risky profits and guaranteed profits equally by maximizing the sum of their ex ante expectations.
The following theorem characterizes the equilibrium in discrete case of Model 2.
THEOREM 3. In Model 2 with trading period number N, a subgame perfect equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, there are real numbers β n , λ n , α n and Σ n , such that:
(n = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1), (4.5)
(n = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1), (4.6)
in which the sequences {a n }, {b n }, {c n }, with terminal values a N −1 = 0, b N −1 = 1 2 , c N = 1, are given recursively: a n−1 = a n ( 1 c 2 n + 1
Compared with Theorem 1 in Model 1, the only difference literally is insider's strategy formulation (4.10). Inspecting it shows the insider's trading intensity coefficient c n is a decreasing function of a n + b n . This means that if insider has more ability to earn the ex ante expectation of future profits that cumulated from the next period to the end, then she will trade less aggressively at the current period to keep more information advantage for the next period.
Specifically, as in Model 1, we investigate the two periods case for Model 2 (with endogenous parameters added an upper index (2)) and compare our results to those of Kyle (1985) (with endogenous parameters added an upper index (0)). By (3.21), the ex ante expectation of profits in Kyle (1985) satisfies
In Model 2, the endogenous parameters result in a larger ex ante expectation of profits, i.e.,
Moreover, we have,
2 > β
1 > λ
2 < λ
2 .
Thus, the insider trades more aggressively, reveals more information, and induces a higher adverse selection in the initial period and a lower adverse selection in the last period in Model 2 than in Kyle (1985) model. These results can generalize to the N-period case which we will show numerically.
The Limit Behavior When N → ∞
Similarly, we need some preliminary results for the limit results, given by following.
PROPORSITION 4. The sequence {c n } in Theorem 3 can be achieved as follows. Given c n , c n−1 is determined by the unique root lies in (0, 1) of equation
with terminal values c N = 1. Moreover, the following monotonicity holds:
With the Proposition 3, the limit of discrete equilibrium of Model 2 follows. Unlike in Model 1, we focus on the first class of limits since the limit equilibrium exists. THEOREM 4. When N → ∞, the sequences {a n }, {b n } and {c n } in Theorem 3 have limits:
for any t ∈ (0, 1). Moreover,
Insider dissipates her private information gradually, that is,
From Theorem 4, the discrete equilibrium results of Model 2 converge to the continuous equilibrium results of Kyle (1985) . Therefore, as trading happens more and more frequently, the difference between equilibriums in discrete case when insider takes the pricing rule as can (a) Unrevealed information Σ n . 
(b) The approximation by limit results and the actual discrete results when N=100. and cannot be influenced disappears. This fact might stem form the continuity of liquidity parameter when trading happens continuously in the sense the liquidity parameter that will arise can be deduced accurately from the former level, regardless of whether or not insider thinks she can influence it.
Numerical Results
Since the Model 2 has the same limit equilibrium as Kyle (1985) , it is necessary to consider the discrete case depicted numerically. Figure 4 shows that compared to Kyle (1985) , the insider in Model 2 trades more aggressively on private information (Figure 4(c) ) and reveals
(a) Liquidity parameter λ n with changing period numbers N = 5, N = 20, N = 100.
(b) The approximation by limit results and the actual discrete results when N=100. more information by any time t > 0 (Figure 4(a) ). The more aggressive trading in Model 2 induces a higher adverse selection for a long time, and then results in a slightly lower adverse in the last few periods due to the less scale of unrevealed information (Figure 4(b) . Note also that λ n σ 2 u represents the expected liquidity cost or informed profits in the nth period. Thus, subfigure 4(b) implies that the insider in Model 2 can obtain a higher ex ante expectation of total profits across all periods compared to that in Kyle (1985) . 
MODEL 3: THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE RISK-SEEKING INSIDER MODEL
The Discrete Equilibrium
The risk-seeking insider in Model 3 behaves oppositely to the risk-averse insider in Model 1. The following theorem characterizes the equilibrium in discrete case of Model 3, with insider's strategies distinct from those in the former two models.
THEOREM 5. In Model 3 with trading period number N, a subgame perfect linear equi-librium exists. In this equilibrium, there are real numbers β n , λ n , α n and Σ n , such that:
in which the sequences {a n }, {b n }, {c n }, with terminal values
are given recursively: a n−1 = a n ( 1 c 2 n + 1
From (5.10), we find that in the nth period, the insider's trading intensity coefficient c n is decreasing with the marginal risky profits estimated in the n+1th period b n . This reflects the fact, in contrast to that in Model 1, the risk-seeking insider has an incentive to trade less currently to keep more information for the next period, provided her with more ability to earn risky profits in the next period.
Like the former 2 models, we can solve the equilibrium easily when N = 2. In Model 3, we add an upper index (3) to the endogenous parameters. Calculations show:
Therefore, at the beginning of trading, the risk-seeking insider in Model 3 obtains larger risky profits at the cost of smaller guaranteed profits relative to the Model 1, 2 and Kyle (1985) model.
The Limit Behavior When N → ∞
Similarly, in Model 3, we have:
PROPORSITION 5. The sequence {c n } in Theorem 5 can be achieved as follows. Given c n , c n−1 is determined by the unique root lies in (0, 1) of equation
and sequence {b n } has an expression of sequence {c n }
THEOREM 6. When N → ∞, the sequences {a n }, {b n }, and {c n } in Theorem 5 have limits:
The insider exploits her private information slowly, that is,
The approximation by limit results and the actual discrete results when N=20. As shown by Theorem 6, the information revealing speed, liquidity parameter and trading intensity in limit are all increasing with calender time t. Compared to the corresponding limit results in Kyle (1985) (or Model 2), the risk-seeking insider in model 3 always trades less aggressively, always acquires larger risky profits( and smaller guaranteed profits at the beginning of trading), and by any time t > 0 reveals less information. When t < 1 − √ 3 3 , the adverse selection is lower than that in Kyle (1985) due to the low trading intensity while
, the adverse selection is higher than that in Kyle (1985) due to the large scale of unrevealed information. Moreover, (5.18) and (5.19) imply that insider's ability of earning risky profits is about twice that of earning guaranteed profits, whereas it is "half"
in Model 1 and "equal to" in Model 2.
Numerical Results
Figure 8(a) depicts that the information released to price is of the least scale among our three models by any time t > 0. At the initial periods, the decline speed is low and only when time approaching the end, the speed is accelerated to exploit the large information remained unrevealed. Actually, the risk-seeking insider would like to maintain her information advantage to the end to acquire high future profits with high risk. These results are actually implying the "waiting game" effect once investigated by Foster and Viswanathan (1996) in which insiders make relatively small trades for the current periods and large for future, with the hope that the others would push the price to a wrong direction in the future.
The approximation by limit results and the actual discrete results when N=20. By contrast, the motivation here is the risk-seeking behavior of a monopolistic insider while it is the negative related signals endowed to competitive insiders there.
Figure 9(a) shows for each period number N, the adverse selection is increasing with trades, and this is in sharp contrast to the other models with decreasing adverse selection.
This increase pattern is consistent with Figure 7 (a)'s implication that most amount of the private information is dissipated at the latter trading periods. Moreover, for a large N, the market maker's sensitivity to order flow is higher and the increasing is more pronounced. 
Conclusion
We improve the Kyle (1985) model by loosening the assumption of constant pricing rule.
By taking the effect insider's strategy has on pricing rule into consideration, we present three models vary with different risk attitudes of the insider.
Model 1 shows the risk-averse insider case, where the insider primarily maximizes the guaranteed profits. In equilibrium, the insider trades in a way similar to that produced by the "rat race" effect once depicted by Holden and Subrahamanyam (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1996) . When trades happens more and more frequently, the insider exploits the private information at an exponential speed, yielding a strong-form efficient market within any positive time. Model 2 focuses on the risk-neutral insider case, where the insider primarily maximizes the ex ante expectation of profits. In the limit as period number goes to infinity, Model 2 obtains exactly the continuous equilibrium in Kyle (1985) . Model 3 presents the risk-seeking insider case, where the insider primarily maximizes the risky profits. The risk-seeking behavior motivates results similar to those by "waiting game" effect in Foster and Viswanathan (1996) with large trades postponed and most information revealed in the latter periods of trading.
Comparison among the three models shows: 1, As to the information revealing speed, Model 1 is highest and Model 3 is lowest. This means that the more risk-averse one is, the faster she will exploit her information advantage. 2, The coefficient of trading intensity that increasing through trades for all the three models, implies the fact that the downward trend of effect current trading has on the future with time going on is robust respect to various risk attitudes. 3, The adverse selection is decreasing through trades in Model 1 and 2 with a lower decreasing speed in Model 2, whereas it is increasing in model 3. This means that the more one is risk-seeking, the more likely relatively high adverse selection will be aroused when trading ends up.
Appendix A
By the Proposition 1 in Huddart etal., (2001), we have β
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: Denote y 1 , y 2 · · · , y N as the orthonormalization of sequence y 1 , y 2 · · · , y N . Clearly, for each n, y n = β n (v − p n−1 ) + u n . Thus by definitions, any
) cannot be affected by b n (y 1 , · · · , y n−1 ) and c n , since they are all determined by y k , k = 1, · · · , N.
Proof of the other conclusions need backward induction. In the last period, insider earns
has a formulation as (2.7) with
If the conclusions hold for n + 1th period, that is, there exists non-random real numbers
and b n+1 (y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n ), c n+1 can affect term h n , but cannot affect terms α n or δ n . Then stepping back by one period, we have:
Hence (2.7), with (2.8) -(2.10) holds for n. Thus, b n (y 1 , · · · , y n−1 ) and c n cannot affect α n−1 (v − p n−1 ) 2 + δ n−1 since they cannot affect price p n−1 or parameters α n , λ n , δ n in the formulations (2.8) and (2.10). In conclusion, Proposition 2 holds.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Firstly, from (3.10), we have (3.25). Then substituting for a n and a n−1 from(3.25) into (3.8), and rearranging yields
Noting that both (A.1) and (3.9) are expressions for b n−1 , their equivalency gives (3.24).
Substituting for b n and b n−1 from (3.24) into (3.9), and rearranging shows (3.22).
The monotonicity is verified as follows. Firstly, the equation (3.22) may be written as
Secondly, suppose for a general n, the inequality c n−1 < c n < 1 (A.3) holds. Then claim that c n−2 < c n−1 , otherwise c n−2 ≥ c n−1 , a contradiction follows. In fact, for (A.2), by (A.3), RHS > 1. But
Thus, equation (A.2) cannot hold. In conclusion, by the backward induction, the monotonicity (3.23) holds.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: There are three steps in this proof. In step one we show that for any continuous time t ∈ (0, 1), in the limit as N → ∞, c [N t] converges to zero and both b [N t] and a [N t] converge to infinity. In step two, we give the convergence speeds of
. In step three, based on the former two steps, we give the characteristics of limit behaviors for sequences {Σ n }, {λ n }, and {β n } as N → ∞.
Step one: This step employs a method once used in the limit equilibrium in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) . To emphasize the dependence, denote c n in economy with N periods by c Now, hold a particular time t ∈ (0, 1). For any subsequence of {1, 2, · · · , n, · · · }, we can choose a sub-subsequence from it, denoted as
is decreasing with k and hence has a limit as k → ∞, denoted as c t . For the same reason c 
From the arbitrariness of ǫ, we have c t = lim
Hence, the claim has been proved. An examination of this proof shows lim
Thus, when N → ∞, substituting c n = c n−1 = c n−2 = c t into equation (3.22), we have Further, from (3.26), (3.27) and (3.28) can be easily obtained from (3.24) and (3.25).
Step two: In this step, it is crucial to find the speed of c (N ) [N t] converging to zero. To do this, take the function ln on both sides of (3.22), and rearrange, yielding 3 ln c n−1 − 2 ln c n−2 − ln c n = 1 2 ln(1 + c
Then by Taylor expansion near zero ln(1 + x) = x − 1 2 x 2 + O(x 3 ), (A.9) can be written as
in which β is a parameter to be fixed later. By Taylor expansion near zero ln(1 + x) = x + O(x 2 ), (A.10) and (A.12) give (A.13)
Substituting (A.13) into LHS of (A.11) and rearranging yields
Similarly,
Equating LHS to RHS yields β = 1/2 . In conclusion,
and equivalently,
This is exactly (3.29). (3.30) and (3.31) can be achieved from combining (3.29) (3.24) and (3.25). For holden n, the limits of c n , b n , a n as N → ∞ correspond to t = 0 in (3.29)-(3.31) respectively since n/N → 0.
Step three: Now, we take the limits of sequences {Σ n }, {λ n } and {β n } as N → ∞ using the former preliminary results. From (3.17) and (3.7), Thus, for t ∈ (0, 1), the monotonicity property of sequence {c n } implies (3.33). Note that c (1 + c 2 n )σ u ∆t 1/2 N , implying (3.34) and (3.35). Results about sequence {β n } can be deduced easily from (3.7).
PROOF OF THEOREM 3: In the last period, solutions are the same as those in Model 1, since for any strategy taken from X N , insider's guaranteed profits are zero, and thus the three models degenerate to the same one.
Suppose in the n + 1th period, conclusions hold. Then, if the informed submission in nth period is β n (v − p n−1 ), the profits accumulated from nth to the last period would be E[ N k=n π k |p 1 , · · · , p n−1 , v] = α n−1 (v − p n−1 ) 2 + δ n−1 with α n−1 = α n (1 − λ n β n ) 2 + β n (1 − λ n β n ), δ n−1 = δ n + α n λ (β 2 n Σ n−1 + σ 2 u ∆t N ) 3 < 0.
Substituting (A.14) into the above yields −(a n + b n )(−2c Combined with (4.10), (A.15) can be satisfies by c n > 0 in our equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: From (4.10), we have,
2 n c n (1 + c 2 n ) 1/2 − a n .
(A.16) Substituting (A.16) into (4.8) yields a n−1 = a n ( 1 1 + c 2 n ) 3/2 + (1 − c 2 n )c n (1 + c 2 n ) 2 .
(A.17)
The sum of equation (4.9) plus (A.17) gives a n−1 + b n−1 = (a n + b n )( 1 1 + c 2 n ) 3/2 + 2c n (1 + c 2 n ) 2 .
(A.18)
Substituting for a n +b n and a n−1 +b n−1 from (4.10) into (A.18) and rearranging yields (4.11).
To show the monotonicity, change Since the LHS of (A.19) is decreasing with c n−1 , and the RHS is decreasing with c n , c n−1 can be considered as an increasing function of c n . Combined with another fact c N −1 < c N , this fact implies c N > c N −1 > · · · , > c 2 > c 1 .
PROOF OF THEOREM 4: The proof of (4.13) -(4.15) is similar to that in the step one of Theorem 2 and is omitted. Take ln on both sides of (4.11), we have Q.E.D.
